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INTRODUCTION 
 
The professional and technical Operations staff at Hinkley Point B Power Station (HPB) have changed 
from working two similar 3 shift rotas to a common 12 hr 2 shift rota. The change was instigated to 
mitigate several issues with the original rotas. The alternative rota was introduced under the control of the 
company’s Management of Change (MoC) arrangements under Licence Condition 36 and a paper to the 
company’s Nuclear Safety Committee. The rota was implemented initially during a 20 week trial period 
throughout which a wide range of performance indicators were monitored and examined.  
 
The results for the 20 week trial did not show any detrimental effect on the performance indicators 
associated with the change from the 3 shift rotas to the new HPB 2 shift (12 hr) rota. It was concluded 
that the change to the HPB 12 hr rota was not detrimental either to nuclear or personnel safety and was a 
valid and acceptable alternative to the original HPB 3 shift rotas previously undertaken. 
 
The rota has now been in place since October 2000 and continues to be popular with shift operations staff 
and is still showing no long term degradation effects in the monitored performance indicators.  
 
 
REASONS FOR THE CHANGE 
 
Prior to changing to the HPB 12 hr rota the Operations (Ops) Engineers and the Operate Technicians (Op 
Techs) who operate HPB worked similar 3 shift, rapidly backward-rotating patterns that repeated every 5 
weeks.  
  
During 1998 and 1999 a number of HPB operations staff attended training courses on shiftwork and 
human performance. This led to the recognition that, when viewed against established human factors best 
practice, the HPB 3 shift rotas were deficient in several respects including:  
 
•  Accumulated fatigue due to the double back shifts (the end of the morning shift occurs on the same 
day as the start of the next night shift);  
•  Working up to four nights in a row; 
•  Backward shift rotation of the shift (i.e. mornings followed by nights followed by evenings). 
 
Whilst there was no direct evidence that the health and wellbeing of HPB shift staff had been 
detrimentally affected from working the 3 shift rotas, there was a consensus that an alternative shift rota 
should be considered. This view was reinforced by an external  peer review carried out under the World 
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) programme (Ref. 2) which had also highlighted problems 
with the shift working arrangements at HPB similar to those identified by the Operations staff. 
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Several alternative rotas were investigated, including forward rotating 3 shift rotas as well as various 12 
hr rotas. The rota that received the most support from the Operations staff consisted of the following basic 
sequence: two 12 hour day shifts, 36 hours off, two 12 hour night shifts, 5 days off. The complete rota is 
shown in Appendix A and is referred to as the HPB 12 hr rota in this paper. The rota addresses many of 
the problems identified with the 3 shift rota in that it is forward rotating, there is more opportunity for 
recovery after nights and the ‘double back’ is removed. In addition, opportunities for shift handover errors 
are reduced as the number is reduced from three to two per day and the handovers are timed so that they 
are outside the normal maintenance working period thus removing disruption to maintenance work.  
 
 
CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
  
The proposal to implement a HPB 12 hr rota for Operations staff was introduced as a change to 
organisational structure or resources that potentially affected nuclear safety and so came under the 
company’s arrangements for Licence Condition 36.The required change proposal document was issued by 
the Station in September 2000. The Management of Change (MoC) proposal was that all shift Operations 
staff at HPB change from the existing 3 shift rotas to the new HPB 12 hr rota for a 20 week trial period. 
The MoC proposal covered the following: 
 
•  The perceived advantages of 12 hr working in terms of staff wellbeing and the opportunity to 
reduce the likelihood of operator error as a result of reduced numbers of shift hand-overs;  
•  The potential effect on operator performance and Station risk in moving to the HPB 12 hr rota 
together with arguments and strategies for mitigating potential detrimental effects of the change; 
•  Working arrangements and facilities that needed to be in place before the start of the 20 week 
trial; 
•  Arrangements for monitoring the effect of the 20 week trial on selected performance indicators;  
•  The option to terminate the 20 week trial and revert to the HPB 3 shift rotas if either the 
Operations staff voted against continuing with it or any significant adverse trends in the 
monitored performance indicators were detected. 
 
 
RISKS AND MITIGATION 
 
The formal change proposal produced under the LC36 arrangements highlighted a range of potential risk 
areas associated with changing from the existing 3 shifts to 2 (12 hr ) shifts and considered the likely 
impact of these risks together with how their effect might be reduced or eliminated. The following 
presents the key risk areas and associated mitigating arguments and measures addressed together with 
further developments agreed with the NII.  
 
 
Risk 1 
The arrangements to cover for planned and unplanned absenteeism could result in an individual working 
excessive hours with inadequate rest periods thus resulting in errors due to excessive fatigue.  
 
Mitigation  
The MoC addressed the risk by requiring a standby rota to be adopted that would enable the overtime 
cover to be planned and controlled against the Station’s working time policy. To ensure arrangements 
were working effectively, the average overtime and the maximum number of consecutive overtime shifts 
worked by individuals were monitored. To reduce the impact of unplanned absences, the MoC also 
required rest facilities to be made available for any personnel needed to remain on site at the end of their 
shift to provide emergency plan cover. 
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The change from the established HPB 3 shift rota could be unsettling and the move to the HPB 12 hr rota 
could potentially reduce staff morale. 
 
Mitigation  
The MoC required a ballot of staff to be carried out with its details to be agreed by Management and local 
union representatives prior to commencement of the 20 week trial. A vote against the HPB 12 hr shift 
would have resulted in a return to a 3 shift rota.  
 
Risk 3 
The Station’s Safety Case relies on operator actions, both pre-trip to identify and initiate a manual reactor 
trip and post trip to undertake any required post trip actions. Increased sleepiness and fatigue may have a 
detrimental effect on the operator’s performance in undertaking these actions.  
 
Mitigation 
Reviews of the literature (Refs. 5 and 6) summarised in the MoC suggested that the detrimental effect of 
12 hr shifts on performance was unproven, therefore, it was decided to examine whether any particular 
characteristics of the proposed 12 hr shift rota could lead to increased fatigue or sleep deprivation. The 
HPB 3 shift rotas and the HPB 12 hr rota were assessed using two shift system assessment 
methodologies. The first methodology, ‘ShiftCheck’ (Ref. 7), provides a guide to how a proposed shift 
rota would disrupt a person’s normal living pattern, by taking account of the work schedule effects 
including night work, length of shifts, social or domestic interference, etc. A comparison of the HPB 3 
shift rotas with the proposed HPB 12 hr rota indicated the HPB 12 hr rota offered a small reduction in the 
potential for disruption.  
 
The second methodology, the Health and Safety Executive Fatigue Index (Ref. 8), provides an indication 
of the level of fatigue associated with a particular shift rota. It takes account of  start time of shift, level of 
workload, shift duration, rest period between shifts, breaks taken during shifts and cumulative fatigue. 
Application of the Fatigue Index to the HPB 3 shift rotas and the proposed HPB 12 hr shift rota showed 
little difference between the 12 hr shift rota  and the 3 shift rotas.  
 
Whilst the two shift assessment methodologies did not identify any particular problems with the HPB 12 
hr rota, it was considered appropriate to take reasonably practical steps to reduce fatigue. Therefore, the 
MoC identified certain measures to reduce fatigue levels and various intervention strategies were 
proposed to enable shift workers to cope better with shift work. These strategies were incorporated in the 
working arrangements for the 12 hr shift trial and included, providing training for staff in shiftwork 
coping strategies, rest breaks away from the place of work and controlled facilities for napping during 
break periods.  
 
Risk 4 
It is possible that the reliability of operator action pre-trip, post trip or when performing a manual trip in 
response to alarms may be degraded. This may have an impact on the likelihood of radioactive release 
 
Mitigation 
The MoC assessed the potential impact of fatigue on the likelihood of radioactive release by assuming 
fatigue would have most effect on claimed pre-trip and manual trip actions and arguing that the 
motivating effect of the conditions associated with post trip actions would make them less vulnerable to 
fatigue. The human error probabilities (HEPs) associated with pre-trip and manual trip actions modelled 
in the reactor Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) (Ref. 4) were increased by a factor of 2 to reflect the 
possible impact of fatigue. The results reported in the MoC showed that the frequency of an uncontrolled 
release increased by 1.46E-06, equivalent to a 9% increase in overall risk. Subsequently, as part of their 
assessment of the MoC, NII asked BEGL to carry out additional sensitivity studies and to provide further 
justification that the HPB 12 hr rota would not impact risk. These requests included: 
 
  31.  Reactor PSA sensitivity studies in which all the HEPs (pre-trip, manual trip and post trip actions) 
were increased by factors of 2, 4 and 6; 
2.  Fuel route PSA sensitivity studies in which the HEPs were increased by factors of 2, 4 and 6;  
3.  Explanation of how plant outages would be affected by the HPB 12 hr rota and an estimate of how it 
might impact shutdown risk; 
4.  Evidence that the risk from all sources that could be affected by the HPB 12 hr rota was being 
addressed. 
 
The reactor PSA sensitivity studies showed an increase in risk with increases in operator unreliability. 
This was not unexpected since all post trip cooling relies on the operator to some extent in order to 
achieve cooling for the assessed 24 hr mission period. However, the analysis showed that even with the 
maximum factor increase in HEPs, no new significantly dominating sequences were identified and no 
single operator action became a dominating factor. In this context it is worth noting, that even following 
severe reactor faults, a period of several hours is usually available before operator action becomes 
essential to prevent a large release. On this timescale a highly trained team would have been rapidly 
assembled following such an event; in these circumstances it is judged that the reliability of required 
actions would be unaffected by the shift rota being worked. 
 
The extended studies of the Fuel Route and Shutdown reactor risk also showed greater sensitivity to 
increases in operator unreliability than the original MoC figure, however, this was also not unexpected, 
given the role of the operator in these areas. The radwaste plant was identified as the only other potential 
source of risk, and whilst some fault sequences involve operator action, these were small contributors to a 
very small frequency of off-site release.  
 
Although the various sensitivity studies show an increase in risk with increased operator unreliability, the 
HEP increase factors employed are hypothetical. To understand the real implications of the studies a 
realistic assessment would need to be made of the expected fatigue experienced by an operator from the 
HPB 12 hr rota and the resultant actual effect on operator unreliability estimated. No currently accepted 
method for doing this is available; therefore, emphasis has been placed on guarding against any increase 
in fatigue and monitoring a range of performance indicators for any trends that could be linked with the 
change to 12 hr shifts.  
 
WORKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRIAL 
 
As previously outlined, consideration was given in the change proposal as to how any detrimental effects 
of 12 hr shifts could be minimised; this resulted in the development of a range of measures to reduce 
fatigue. The measures were put in place prior to the start of the 20 week trial and consisted of : 
 
1.  Providing staff with training on how to cope with shiftwork;  
2.  Providing suitably equipped rest rooms separate from the normal place of work;  
3.  Ensuring staff had the opportunity to take two 30 minute breaks away from the place of work in 
each 12 hour shift;  
4.  Authorising the use of the rest rooms for napping during the two 30 minute breaks;   
5.  An agreement between Management and Staff Representatives on the final form of the HPB 12 
hour shift rota including the start and finish times of each day, night and spare shift, and the 
arrangements for planned and unplanned shift cover.  
 
MONITORING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRIAL 
Although the risk assessments described earlier suggest that 12 hr shifts should not have a significant 
detrimental impact on operator performance, it was considered important to monitor performance during 
the 20 week trial for any adverse or beneficial effects. Two sets of indicators were monitored: key 
indicators which would show any impact on nuclear safety, personnel safety, staff wellbeing and staff 
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shiftwork (e.g. increased fatigue) that in due course could impact the key indicators. Whilst both positive 
and negative effects of 12 hr shifts should have been detected by these indicators, some of the identified 
benefits  are self evident in the change itself, e.g. removing the double back shift.  
 
REVIEW ARRANGEMENTS 
 
At the outset it was recognised that the performance indicators would need to be reviewed regularly so 
that any adverse trends would be identified and acted on promptly. A 12 hr Shift Review Group (Review 
Group) was constituted to facilitate this process. The function of the Review Group was to monitor the 
performance indicators, identify any developing adverse trends and provide advice to the Station Director 
on any changes needed to the 12 hr shift arrangements, including terminating the HPB 12 hr rota trial. 
The Review Group met every two weeks under the chairmanship of the Ops Manger and had the 
following membership: 
 
•  2 Ops Engineers 
•  2 Op Techs 
•  1 Human Factors Specialist 
 
The Review Group also had access to additional shift work expertise through the Shift Work Research 
Group, University of Leeds which provided advice on how to monitor the effects of 12 hr working and 
analysed the data collected from a number of the supporting indicators. 
 
RESULTS FROM THE TRIAL 
Nuclear and Personnel Safety events. 
 
The number and seriousness of nuclear and personnel safety events are key Station performance 
indicators. To see whether the HPB 12 hr rota was having an influence on them, events and near misses 
associated with operational staff errors were collected during both the 20 week trial and a ‘baseline’ 
period of 3 shift rota working.  
 
A comparison of the frequency of nuclear safety events showed that fewer events per week occurred in 
the 20 week, 0.35 events per week compared with 0.86 per week during the ‘baseline’ period of 3 shift 
working. A similar comparison of personnel safety events also showed fewer events per week occurring 
during the 20 week trial, 0.25 events per week compared with 0.39 per week during the ‘baseline’ period 
of 3 shift working. These results indicate that working the HPB 12 hr rota during the 20 week trial did not 
increase the probability of the occurrence of nuclear and personnel safety events. 
 
Staff Sickness Absence 
 
The number of days sickness absence is a potential indicator of staff wellbeing. A significant increase in 
the number of days absent due to sickness for Operations staff could be indicative of a detrimental effect 
of 12 hr working on staff health. Operational staff sickness absence records were collected during both 
the 20 week trial and a ‘baseline’ period of 3 shift rota working. The analysis of sickness records for the 
two periods showed that the Operational staff sickness was significantly reduced during the 20 week trial, 
18.8 days per week sickness absence occurred during the 20 week trial compared with 30.39 days per 
week during the ‘baseline’ period of 3 shift working.  
 
To investigate whether the reduction in sickness was due to 12 hr shifts or was the result of a general 
change in the pattern of sickness at the Station, the sickness records for a different group of staff not 
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group not working shifts. No significant differences in sickness were found between the 20 week trial and 
the equivalent 3 shift rota periods for this group of staff. This tends to suggest that the reduction in the 
Operations staff sickness may have been related to the change in working patterns rather than due to other 
external influences.  
Staff Acceptance 
 
A key issue with regard to HPB 12 hr rota working was its acceptance by the Operations staff. A postal 
ballot of all Operations staff was undertaken during the 20 week trial. The results of the ballot showed 
that on a return of 93% the percentage of Operational staff in favour of continuing with HPB 12 hr rota 
was 86%. This met the acceptance criterion for continuing the Trial. 
 
Alertness and Fatigue 
 
Four performance indicators were introduced for the 20 week trial to measure more directly any potential 
effects of the HPB 12 hr rota on alertness and fatigue. The indicators were Critical Flicker Fusion, 
Logical Reasoning, self reporting of alertness and fatigue and alarm response times.  Data on the first 
three were obtained by administering the relevant tests and questionnaire to a group of Operations staff 
who agreed to participate in the data collection exercise. Alarm response times were collected from the 
Station’s Data Processing System (DPS). The results for each of these indicators are presented below. 
 
Critical Flicker Fusion (CFF) 
CFF values give some indication of the level of central nervous system activity and are measured by 
increasing the frequency of a flashing light to the point where an observer ‘sees’ the discrete pulses of 
light fuse. CFF values tend to reduce for an observer when he or she is less alert or is fatigued. Data from 
CFF tests were collected from Operations staff for a ‘baseline’ period when they were working the 3 shift 
rota and at 3 weekly intervals during the 20 week trial. The overall finding from the analysis of the CFF 
data was that there was no systematic reduction in CFF when the values for the 20 week trial were 
compared with those obtained during 3 shift rota working. 
 
Logical Reasoning (LR) 
The LR test as the name implies is an indication of an individual’s ability to think logically. LR data were 
collected at 3 weekly intervals during the 20 week trial. The results showed no deterioration of 
performance over the 20 week duration of the trial. LR data were also collected at 4 hourly intervals 
during shifts to investigate whether an individual’s LR ability changed over the course of a shift. 
Comparison of the error rates between the first 8 hrs and the last 4 hrs tended to indicate that the 
additional hours worked per shift were not detrimental to operator performance.  
 
Self Reporting Questionnaire 
Operations staff were asked to self report on their experience of shiftworking by filling in a questionnaire 
that recorded in a systematic way how they currently perceived a range of shift work issues. The 
questionnaire included questions about sleep quality, alertness, fatigue, shift rota satisfaction and 
workload. Participating staff completed questionnaires for a ‘baseline’ period during 3 shift working and 
at 3 weekly intervals during the 20 week trial. Overall the analysis of the questionnaire data showed no 
indication of any systematic deterioration in the responses when comparing the HPB 12 hr rota with the 3 
shift rotas. In fact the evidence suggested that responses generally improved on the HPB 12 hr shift rota. 
 
Alarm Response Times 
The recently replaced HPB Data Processing System (DPS) automatically records when an alarm is 
initiated and when the reactor desk engineer (RDE) acknowledges it. This allows the time taken by a 
RDE to respond to an alarm to be determined. It was thought that alarm responses times might be 
sensitive to fatigue and alertness levels. Alarm response data were collected for the 20 week trial and a 
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the two periods that would suggest fatigue significantly influenced alarm response times. 
 
 
LONGER TERM RESULTS  
 
General 
  Baseline  Weeks of working 12hr Shifts   
  44   20   40   66   71/2   98   119  142  Weeks 
Nuclear Safety 
Events 
0.86  0.35 0.47 0.45 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.35  Ave  Events 
per Week 
Personnel 
Safety Events 
0.39  0.25 0.25 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.11  Ave  Events 
per Week 
Sickness  
+30.41
  18.80 20.50 21.71 21.61 25.97 25.23 26.54 Ave  Days   
*Baseline 
Equivalent 
31.0  40.06 31.00 31.30 30.96 28.49 30.02 29.18 per  Week 
Overtime  4.60  3.00 2.92 2.80 2.73 2.95 2.65 2.67  Ave  Hours  per 
person per 
week 
 
+ Original baseline sickness week ending 10 Oct 99 to 6 Aug 01 
*To preserve a seasonal comparison, additional baseline data has been collected to provide complete years worth of 
baseline data (8 Aug 99 to 6 Aug 00). This data has been arranged for a seasonal comparison against the 142 weeks 
of the 12hr working. i.e. 12hr working 22 Oct 00 to 5-Aug 01 compared with baseline 24-Oct-99 to 6-Aug-00, 12hr 
11-Aug-02 to 26 Jan 03 compared with baseline 8-Aug-99 to 23-Jan-00, etc.  
 
 
Sickness  
 
The total ops staff rolling average sickness absence data for the 12hr working period remains below the 
equivalent baseline levels. There has been a gradual increase over the 12hr working period which has 
levelled off at a rolling average of 25 days sickness absence per week.  
 
Separating the sickness data into self and doctor certified sickness absences shows that during the 12h-
working period there has been a noticeable reduction in the average doctor certified sickness compared to 
the baseline and an increase in self reported sickness over the period of 12hr working compared to 
baseline. Both the doctor and self certified rolling averages have tended to level out at approximately 11 
and 15 days per week respectively. 
 
The reason for the increase in the level of self certified absences over the equivalent baseline self certified 
absences is likely to be due to the way sickness is reported. For example, consider a period of sickness 
that requires 5-9 days to recover from. The shift pattern on the HPB 12hr rota would result in the 
individual only having to take 4 working days off work. On the original 3 shift rota this would required an 
individual to take up to 7 working days off work. Hence the tendency for more self-certified and less 
doctor certified reporting during 12hr working. However, the overall reduction in sickness absence, 
combining self and doctor certified absences, tends to indicate that sickness absence during the 12hr 
working arrangements is no worse than the 3 shift working period. 
 
 
Nuclear Safety and Personnel Safety Events  
 
Compared to the baseline period the rolling average number of nuclear and personnel safety events have 
reduced. After a period of relative stability during the first year of 12hr working the trend over the last 
year and 7 months has seen a small reduction levelling off at a rolling average for the period of 0.35 
Nuclear Safety and 0.11 Personnel safety events per week.  
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Overtime and Number of OT Shifts worked in a Week  
 
The rolling average overtime appears to have stabilised at around 2.6 to 2.7 hours per person per week 
compared to the 4.6 hours per person per week level recorded during the baseline period.  
 
Over the later period of 12hr working (weeks 119 onward) an increase in the 'per week average overtime' 
has been observed . There are a number of reasons for this, two members of staff have recently retired on 
ill health, which has required overtime cover during the period. Overtime working to cover specific 
maintenance activities on control rod actuators and blow down plant repairs during the period was 
necessary. There was a fuel route outage during February/March, which took additional resource, and the 
outage team was also put in place during June to ensure outage preparations for operations work was 
managed in accordance with the WM process. 
 
In the last 20 months of 12hr working none of the operations staff working the HPB 12hr rota have 
worked more than two additional shifts in a week. This has been achieved despite the overtime burden 
described above. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The 12hr working arrangements for operational staff have now been in place for over three years. Over 
this period all of the prime indicator values have remained consistently below the 3 shift working values. 
The HPB 12hr working arrangements appear to have been effective in limiting individual exposure to 
fatigue whilst enabling adequate shift cover to be maintained during periods of high workload demand. 
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  8APPENDIX  A: HPB 12 HR 2 SHIFT ROTA  
Operation’s Staff Rota 
  Week 1  Week 2  Week 3  Week 4  Week 5 
                                            M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S
“A”  D               D   N  N     S S D  D   N  N      D D   N  N      D D   N  N
“B”    D                      D   N  N   S S D D   N  N    D  D   N  N   D D   
“C”                             D  D   N  N     D D   N  N S S D D   N  N    D
“D”  N                            D D   N  N    D  D   N  N   S S D D   N  N  
“E”   N  N                         D D   N  N   D D   N  N      D  D   N  N
  M                                            T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S
 
  Week 6  Week 7  Week 8  Week 9  Week 10 
                                            M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S
“A”     S           S D  D  N N       D  D   N N       D  D  N  N       
“B”  N                           N      D  D  N  N  S S D  D  N N    D  D   N N 
“C”  D                            N N    D  D   N N    S S D  D  N  N    D  D  N N 
“D”   D  D                          N  N    D  D  N N      D  D   N N  S S D  D  N
“E”                              S S D  D   N N    D  D  N  N    D  D  N N    S S D  D
  M                                        T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S M T W T F S S 
 
Where   “A-E” identifies the Shift Team 
  D  Day Shift  07:30 to 19:30 hrs 
  N  Night Shift  19:30 to 07:30 hrs 
  S  Spare Shift  08:00 to 16:00 hrs 
Note:  1 hour break (nominally arranged in 2 x 1/4hr breaks plus a 30min break or 2 x 30min breaks) per shift is taken away from the workplace. 
  Where a night shift is shown against a particular day the start of the night shift was on the previous day, i.e. 
  
The night shown *N starts at 19:30 hrs Saturday and finishes 07:30 hrs Sunday  T          F S S M
D        D   *N N
 